The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze, interpret and apply the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. * * * Rooker-Feldman's jurisdictional bar protects the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction under Section 1257 of Title 28 of the United States Code. It ensures that the United States Supreme Court is the only federal court to hear appeals from judgments rendered by the highest court of a state (or, as here, the District of Columbia). See D. C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462, 476, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U. S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923); see also Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D. C. Cir. 2002). Operationally, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine "is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by [i] state-court losers [ii] complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the [federal] district court proceedings commenced and [iii] inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U. S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 161 L. Ed.2d 454 (2005). The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the doctrine is "narrow," applicable to bar only complaints that meet those listed conditions. Id.; see Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U. S. 521, 531, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 179 L. Ed.2d 233 (2011); Lance v. Dennis, 546 U. S. 459, 464, 126 S. Ct. 1198, 163 L. Ed.2d 1059 (2006); see also Singletary v. D. C., 766 F.3d 66, 71 (D. C. Cir. 2014). Indeed, the only two cases in which the Supreme Court has ever applied the doctrine to dismiss an action are the Rooker and Feldman namesake cases themselves. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U. S. at 283, 125 S. Ct. 1517. Croley v. Joint Committee on Judicial Admin., 895 F. 3d 22 (DC Cir. 2018)