Chevron Deference

THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze, interpret, and apply the doctrine of Chevron deference in environmental law cases. Volume 2 of the casebook covers the Sixth through the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. * * * The APA states that a reviewing court shall "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions" found to be "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right[.]" 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(C). The APA further states that "[t]o the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action." Id. § 706. When reviewing an agency's legal determination, the court generally applies the standard of review articulated by the Supreme Court in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U. S. 837 (1984). See id. at 842-44 (asking "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue," and if not, "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute"). There are times, however, when Chevron is inapplicable. "[L]egislative rules and formal adjudications are always entitled to Chevron deference, while less formal pronouncements like interpretive rules and informal adjudications may or may not be entitled to Chevron deference." Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 990 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 229-30 (2001) ("It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force."). In Sinclair, we determined that "Congress did not intend the EPA's interpretation of 'disproportionate economic hardship' to have the 'force of law.'" 887 F.3d at 993. And we concluded that informal adjudications of petitions to extend the small refinery exemption were not subject to Chevron deference. Id. at 992; see also id. (noting, among other things, that such adjudications lack "trial-like procedures" and "the benefit of notice-and-comment"). When Chevron does not apply, "we follow the analysis set forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134 (1944)." Id. at 991 (parallel citations omitted). Skidmore review means that the weight provided to an administrative judgment "will depend upon the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 323 U. S. at 140 (brackets added). Put another way, an administrative ruling under Skidmore may "claim the merit of its writer's thoroughness, logic, and expertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight." Mead, 533 U. S. at 235. Renewable Fuels Association v. EPA, (10th Cir. 2020)