Oman: Reform, Security, and U.s. Policy

Publisher Marketing: The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States for several decades. In 1980, partly in response to the Islamic Revolution in Iran that overthrew the Shah, Oman became the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal agreement with the United States allowing U. S. use of its military facilities, despite sensitivities in Oman about a U. S. military presence there. It hosted U. S. forces during every U. S. military operation in and around the Gulf since 1980 and has become a significant buyer of U. S. military equipment, moving away from its prior reliance on British military advice and equipment. Oman is a partner in U. S. efforts to counter the movement of terrorists and pirates in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, and it has consistently supported U. S. Middle East peacemaking efforts by publicly endorsing peace agreements reached and by occasionally hosting Israeli leadership visits. It was partly in appreciation for this alliance that the United States entered into a free trade agreement (FTA) with Oman, which is also intended to help Oman diversify its economy to compensate for its relatively small reserves of crude oil. Unlike most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies, Oman asserts that confronting Iran is not the optimal strategy to address the potential threat from Iran. Oman's leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id Al Said, has consistently maintained ties to Iran's leaders and discussed large energy sector ventures such as a natural gas pipeline that would link Oman and Iran. Successive U. S. Administrations have generally refrained from criticizing the Iran-Oman relationship, perhaps in part because Oman has been useful as an intermediary between the United States and Iran. An August 2013 visit to Iran by Qaboos, which followed months and possibly years of quiet U. S.-Iran diplomacy brokered by Oman, helped pave the way for the November 24, 2013, interim nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community. Earlier, Oman played the role of broker between Iran and the United States in the September 2011 release of two U. S. hikers from Iran after two years in jail there, and it reportedly is involved in efforts to obtain the release of other U. S. citizens imprisoned in Iran or in territory under Iran's control. Oman's ties to Iran are an example of the Sultanate's largely independent foreign policy that sometimes differs with that of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leader Saudi Arabia. Oman opposes a Saudi effort to promote greater political unity among the six GCC states-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. Oman also differs with the other Gulf states in refraining from any intervention in the Syria civil war. Oman has publicly joined the U. S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization but Oman is apparently not participating militarily in those efforts. Prior to the wave of Middle East unrest that began in 2011, the United States repeatedly praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process without evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allowed Omanis a measure of representation, but did not significantly limit Qaboos' role as paramount decision maker. The modest reforms-as well as the country's economic performance-apparently did not satisfy some Omanis because unprecedented protests took place in several Omani cities for much of 2011. The apparent domestic popularity of Qaboos, coupled with additional economic and political reforms as well as repression of protest actions, caused the unrest to subside by early 2012. High turnout in the October 15, 2011, elections for the lower house of Oman's legislative body suggested that 2011 unrest-and the accelerated reforms launched in response-had fueled new public activism. The first-ever local elections in Oman on December 22, 2012, furthered the political empowerment of the electorate.